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Abstract. Opaque communications between groups of data processors
leave individuals out of touch with the circulation and use of their per-
sonal information. Empowering individuals in this regard requires sup-
plying them — or auditors on their behalf — with clear data handling
guarantees. We introduce an inference model providing individuals with
global (organization-wide) accountability guarantees which take into ac-
count user expectations and varying levels of usage evidence, such as
data handling logs. Our model is implemented in the IDP knowledge
base system and demonstrated with the scenario of a surveillance infras-
tructure used by a railroad company. We show that it is flexible enough
to be adapted to any use case involving communicating stakeholders for
which a trust hierarchy is defined. Via auditors acting for them, individ-
uals can obtain global accountability guarantees, providing them with a
trust-dependent synthesis of declared and proven data handling practices
for an entire organization.
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1 Context and Motivation
Contemporary situations involving the exchange of personal data for services
often leave individuals oblivious as to the actual processing of their data. While
privacy policies are widely used by organizations across the world, they often con-
stitute mere declarations of intent. Individuals generally cannot check whether
actual processing is in line with such ex ante statements. Furthermore, privacy
policies often remain purposely vague while users demand concrete promises
about the retention of their data, the purposes for which it is used, obligations
in terms of third party forwarding and so on.
The rise of individuals’ expectations about data handling transparency, com-
bined with the growing imbalance of power between them and data processing
organizations, has made the principle of accountability a key component of the
discourse over privacy protection. While the concept of accountability was al-
ready mentioned in this context in the eighties [24], it appears more prominently
these days. In particular, the upcoming European General Data Protection Reg-
ulation [12] cites accountability explicitly. Organizations will therefore increas-
ingly be legally required to be accountable for their data handling practices to
data subjects.
A downside of this concept’s popularity is that its meaning has been diluted
due to frequent use in different contexts. Lawyers often focus on procedural as-
pects of accountability [7, 25]. Computer scientists often tackle specific security
properties — such as non-repudiation [2] — or specific technical contexts like
cloud environments [15]. Because of these varied interpretations, no universal
definition of accountability can be given. However, it normally refers to the ne-
cessity of surpassing mere compliance to achieve demonstration of compliance.
By putting the burden of proof of good behavior on the data controller, account-
ability measures increase pressure on organizations to be transparent and fair in
their data handling practices.
In real-world situations, data shared by an individual does often not remain
within the realm of a single entity but it disseminated among communicating
subsystems that may even be geographically distant. Since subcontractors may
belong to different corporations than the organization that collected personal
data in the first place, different data handling policies may apply. The initial
data controller may fulfill its promises as long as data remains in its initial
location, but offer no guarantees about processing by other stakeholders. Such
situations leave individuals blind to the whereabouts of their data.
Even if all involved entities publish clear data handling policies, the end result
is opaque to individuals. Technical privacy policies may be very detailed and
the number of entities may be large. It is useful for individuals to understand
the resulting global (organization- or system-wide) guarantees that apply to
their personal data. If individuals have defined personal privacy preferences for
themselves once and for all, they would also like to know whether the overall
processing of their data by an organization and its subcontractors is in conflict
with those preferences.
This paper introduces a model capable of inferring global accountability guar-
antees from the point of view of a trusted auditor. This auditor acts on behalf
of the user and represents his interests. In practice, the auditor could be a mem-
ber of a Data Protection Authority or a third-party, accredited auditing orga-
nization. The framework allows the hierarchical representation of entities in an
organization, thereby modeling trust relationships: an individual may only trust
a given component in an organization, or may trust an entity higher in the hi-
erarchy, thereby trusting all components operating by that entity. These trust
assumptions (i.e. user expectations) influence the computation of the global ac-
countability guarantees. We distinguish between three levels of users: a naive
user, a regular one and a privacy-aware one. The level of privacy-awareness of a
user influences the kind of evidence this user assumes to be trustworthy.
In addition to these different types of users, data handling statements carry
different levels of evidence. Each entity subcontracting for an organization has
its own data handling statements. At the lowest level, statements are merely
declarations of intent with no additional evidence. This level of evidence is akin
to a detailed, technical privacy policy. Other statements are provided together
with system traces of data handling operations, i.e. logs. These logs are assumed
to be trustworthy, but they have not been inspected. Therefore, it may not
be obvious at first glance that a data processor has misbehaved, even though
a trace of misbehavior is assumed to exist in the logs. The situation where
logs cannot be checked easily is realistic because logs are not standardized in
general, many organizations use very specific formats and because semantics
are often unavailable. The highest level of evidence features statements that
are accompanied by logs that have been verified and found to be compliant.
Here, it is again assumed that the logs are trustworthy, i.e. reflect actual system
execution, and that the log analysis software is sound and accurate.
The three levels of user privacy-awareness and three levels of statement ev-
idence are combined to compute fine-grained global accountability guarantees.
The auditor, on behalf of the user, can both inspect those global guarantees or
detect potential conflicts by providing the privacy preferences of the individual.
Our framework is implemented in IDP, a knowledge base system [11]. We
demonstrate it through the scenario of a surveillance infrastructure managed by
a railroad company and involving a third-party security service company, op-
erators such as a surveillance guard and an image processor, and components
used by these operators. This kind of scenario demonstrates the typical situation
where an individual shares his data with only one entity initially, after which the
entity processes and disseminates the data among several subcontractors. Assum-
ing individuals are monitored via cameras, one can distinguish between several
categories of personal data which can be collected, processed and distributed.
Depending on image quality and on pan-tilt-zoom functionality, cameras may
record full body pictures with insufficient quality to distinguish faces, full body
pictures with blurred faces, faces only or even record behavior patterns while
discarding body images.
As mentioned above, we assume logs (when they exist) to be trustworthy:
they are accurate and cannot be forged by entities. In practice, this requires
techniques such as forward integrity [3] to guarantee the security of logs, and
partial formal modeling or trusted computing to ensure unforgeability. While
these criteria are important, they are outside of the scope of this work: here, we
suppose that logs reflect actual system execution and therefore embody mean-
ingful evidence. Furthermore, we presume that personal data is categorized in a
standardized way, so that individuals and organizations use the same terminol-
ogy for categories of personal data.
We continue with some technical background on the IDP system, a knowl-
edge base system based on an extension of typed first-order logic (§2). The
approach is illustrated by the running example of a railroad surveillance infras-
tructure, presented informally at first (§3). We then introduce the building blocks
of the accountability inference framework and apply it to this scenario (§4). Af-
ter evaluating the results of this implementation of the model (§5), we discuss
related work on formalizations of accountability and privacy (§6), including ex-
isting models for privacy reasoning realized with IDP. The paper concludes with
a discussion of the potential, limitations and future of the framework (§7).
2 IDP
IDP [16, 29] is a state-of-the-art knowledge base system [8] developed by the
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KRR) group at KU Leuven. We
briefly introduce IDP and how it can be used as a tool to manage an account-
ability framework, focusing on the parts of the system relevant for this paper.
More interested readers can find IDP documentation and source code here [16],
and some examples here [17]. In this text we use IDP to refer to IDP3, the
current version of the IDP system. One of the main focuses of IDP is knowledge
representation: allowing users to formulate their knowledge in a intuitive manner.
To this end the FO(·) language framework, an extension of First Order Logic
(FO), was developed. Using this language, users can model their data (in this
case, which organizations or data categories to analyze), as well their knowledge
(here, accountability across organizations) in a formal way using logical formu-
las (constraints) and definitions. This model can be used to solve problems by
applying one of the many inferences IDP provides. For this paper we will need
(optimal) model expansion: given a partial assignment for data, find a complete
(optimal) assignment such that all expressed constraints and definitions hold.
The initial, partial assignment corresponds to the setting of our framework: a hi-
erarchical network of organizations and the accountability guarantees they offer.
The outcome of the model expansion inference then corresponds to a complete
assignment: a listing of which information is used in what places and what kinds
of accountability guarantees it offers. This will later be called the Global Ac-
countability Profile (GAP).
There exists a variety of declarative modeling systems, such as Alloy [19,20]
or ASP solvers [13,22]. We chose to use IDP as our modeling tool for two reasons.
First, the language it uses is expressive and intuitive: it supports extended first
order constraints as well as definitions under well-founded semantics [26]. Second,
it is implemented as an extension in Lua [18], which means there is support for
procedural integration. This allows us to determine the way in which we want
to use our declarative model in a flexible way.
3 A Railway Station Surveillance Scenario
To illustrate the model, we consider the scenario of video camera surveillance
in a railway station. Since individuals are filmed by cameras, the collected cat-
egories of personal data are related to images (we assume the cameras do not
record sound). Several categories of personal data can be inferred from camera
recordings, such as identification through face detection [27], gait recognition [21],
behavioral tracking [23] and many others. Signs inform passersby that the Rail-
way Company installed Cameras for video surveillance. The cameras provide
the railway’sMonitors in the control room with real-time video feeds containing
Blurred Faces and Gaits of travelers. Furthermore, detailed images of individuals’
Full Body and Gait are stored in the railway’s Image Database serving as Evi-
dence in legal investigations. Only authorized Image Processors employed by the
railway company have access to it. Additionally, surveillance Guards employed
by a third-party Security Company patrol in the station. They are authorized to
view real-time images on the monitors, and carry a Mobile Device for registering
Contextual Data (e.g. time and location) in case of incidents. These devices are
connected with the Status Database, property of the security company. It is only
accessible for the security company’s Status Processors upon request of legal
institutions for collecting Evidence.
The trusted auditor (acting on behalf of a filmed individual) is external to
the model and we focus on data handling statements from the entities collecting
personal data, listed in Tab. 1.
4 Components of the Accountability Inference Model
Having set the stage for both our model and the tool that will be used to eval-
uate it, we now describe the framework’s building blocks (depicted in Fig. 1) in
detail. Entities, all related to a core organization, provide individual statements
about their data handling practices. These statements can be provided together
with unverified logs, verified logs, or exist on their own without companion evi-
dence. Different categories of personal data can be modeled. As a consequence,
statements are fine-grained enough to express different guarantees about various
types of personal data. The data subject is represented by a trusted auditor. This
auditor takes into account the subject’s trust perceptions. Global accountability
guarantees are automatically computed using the computation rules in the Sys-
tem Independent Part of the framework. These guarantees are represented by
the Global Accountability Profile (GAP) that is automatically inferred, using a
Knowledge Base System (IDP), from the System Model and the User Model, both
part of the framework’s Input Model. The former models the individual state-
ments, the relations between the entities expressing the statements, and the level
of evidence characterizing the statements. The latter includes the level of trust
of the user. As a consequence, the global accountability guarantees take into ac-
count both factual evidence and subjective appreciations of privacy risks. This
combination reflects the fact that different data subjects demand different levels
of proof to be satisfied. The model provides data subjects with an overview of the
accountability guarantees resulting from a set of interacting entities. In addition,
it allows them (or the auditor, on their behalf) to check whether their personal
privacy preferences are compatible with this global accountability panorama.
The remainder of this section further details the framework’s elements.
4.1 Personal Data
Organizations collect personal data of data subjects that interact with systems
owned by these organizations. Being accountable to data subjects involves clari-
fying which types of their personal data are harvested and used. These categories
Table 1. Camera surveillance data handling statements. Entity statements are
(D)eclarative, (L)ogged-unverified or Logged-and-(V)erified.
(R)ailway Company, (C)amera, (M)onitor, (I)mage Database Statements
Stat R.1 (L) Full body pictures with blurred or clear faces, gaits, heights, and
behavior are recorded for incident detection.
Stat R.2 (D) Collected pictures containing evidence of incidents can be forwarded
to legal authorities upon their request.
Stat R.3 (L) Pictures are never collected for commercial purposes.
Stat R.4 (L) The maximal retention time for any category of collected personal
data is 60 days.
Stat C.1 (L) Cameras in the station record full body pictures with blurred or
clear faces, gaits, heights, and behaviors of travelers for incident
detection purposes.
Stat M.1 (L) Guards monitor in real-time full body pictures with blurred faces,
gaits, heights, and behaviors of travelers in the station for incident
detection purposes.
Stat I.1 (L) Full body pictures with clear faces are stored as evidence of possible
incidents.
Stat I.2 (V) Access to stored full body pictures with clear faces is only granted
to the image processor upon request of the legal authorities.
Stat I.3 (V) Full body pictures with clear faces, gaits, heights, and behavior are
never processed for the purpose of identification.
Stat I.4 (D) Stored images are deleted after 30 days, unless they are being used
as evidence in legal cases.
(S)ecurity Company, M(O)bile Device, Status (D)atabase Statements
Stat S.1 (D) Time and location of incidents are collected as evidence.
Stat S.2 (L) Time and location of incidents are only forwarded to legal authori-
ties upon request.
Stat O.1 (V) Surveillance guards collect time and location as evidence in case of
incidents.
Stat D.1 (V) Time and location of incidents are collected as evidence.
Stat D.2 (V) Access to stored time and location of incidents is granted to status
processors for gathering evidence.
Stat D.3 (V) The time and location of incidents are deleted after 90 days unless
they are being used as legal evidence.
(Naive,Regular,Privacy-Aware)
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Fig. 1. Structure of the global accountability inference model.
are represented by the DataCategory type. All categories of collected personal
data involved in a given scenario must be spelled out in the input model as the
contents of DataCategory.
One can define hierarchies of personal data categories. This models the fact
that categories of personal data can be subsets of other categories, e.g. the age
of an individual gives strictly more information than a predicate on whether the
individual is over 18. The data category hierarchy is represented using Data-
CategoryOf(DataCategory,DataCategory), which deduces hierarchical knowledge
from the initial specifications. Listing 1 depicts the IDP input model for the
personal data and their hierarchy of the camera surveillance scenario.
type DataCategory = { PersData;Face;BlurredFace;Gait;Height;Behavior ;
Location;Time,PictureIncident }
DataCategoryOf (DataCategory,DataCategory) = {
Face,PictureIncident ;BlurredFace,PictureIncident ;Gait,
PictureIncident ;Height,PictureIncident ;Behavior ,PictureIncident }
IDP Listing 1: Partial user model representing personal data categories and
hierarchies in the video surveillance scenario.
4.2 Entities
Data subjects and the auditors that act on their behalf are not explicitly mod-
eled since their point of view is external. An arbitrary number of active entities
can be modeled in the framework’s system model. Active entities are those that
handle personal data of the subjects and provide some degree of accountability,
i.e. declarations (with or without proof) about the data processing they perform.
A distinction is made between Stakeholders and Components. A stakeholder is
either an Organization, or an Operator acting on behalf of exactly one organi-
zation. An organization can employ more than one operator. Components are
constituents of data processing systems. A component belongs to exactly one
organization, but can be used by multiple operators.
Components process personal data under the responsibility of the organiza-
tions that own them. Organizations or authorities may restrict access to the data
categories that a given component is capable of collecting. Authorized categories
for a given component are specified using ComponentCanCollect(Component,
DataCategory). Listing 2 depicts the IDP specification of the entities involved
in the camera surveillance scenario.
type Entity = { RailwayCompany;SecurityCompany;LegalAuthority ;Camera;
Monitor ;MobileDevice;SurveilanceGuard ; ImageProcessor ;
StatusProcessor ; ImageDB;StatusDB }
type Stakeholder isa Entity = { RailwayCompany;SecurityCompany ;
LegalAuthority ;SurveilanceGuard ; ImageProcessor ;StatusProcessor }
type Component isa Entity = { Camera;Monitor ;MobileDevice; ImageDB;
StatusDB }
type Organization isa Stakeholder = { RailwayCompany;SecurityCompany ;
LegalAuthority }
type Operator isa Stakeholder = { SurveilanceGuard ; ImageProcessor ;
StatusProcessor }
ComponentOf (Component) : Organization = { Camera → RailwayCompany;
Monitor → RailwayCompany; ImageDB → RailwayCompany;
StatusDB → SecurityCompany;MobileDevice → SecurityCompany
EmployeeOf(Operator) : Organization = {
SurveilanceGuard → SecurityCompany;
StatusProcessor → SecurityCompany ;
ImageProcessor → RailwayCompany }
OperatorOf (Operator,Component) = { SurveilanceGuard ,Monitor ;
SurveilanceGuard ,MobileDevice; ImageProcessor , ImageDB;
StatusProcessor ,StatusDB }
ComponentCanCollect(Component,DataCategory) = { Camera,Face;
Camera,BlurredFace;Camera,PictureIncident;Camera,Gait;
Camera,Height;Camera,Behavior ;Monitor ,Face;Monitor ,
BlurredFace;Monitor ,PictureIncident ;Monitor ,Gait;Monitor ,Height;
Monitor ,Behavior ; ImageDB,Face; ImageDB,BlurredFace;
ImageDB,PictureIncident; ImageDB,Gait; ImageDB,Height;
ImageDB,Behavior ; ImageDB,Time; ImageDB,Location;StatusDB,
Time;StatusDB,Location;MobileDevice,Time;MobileDevice,
Location }
IDP Listing 2: Partial system model representing the entities and their rela-
tionships in the video surveillance scenario.
4.3 Statements and Local Accountability Statements
All entities involved in data handling relevant to a given data subject are assumed
to exhibit some level of accountability of practice, i.e. they publish precise decla-
rations about their intended personal data handling practices. In general, each
entity publishes a different data handling statement. A one-to-one mapping be-
tween entities and data handling statements is assumed, and is modeled using
function StatementFrom(Statement) : Entity. Listing 3 shows the part of the
system model that defines a subset of the statements of the railway company
listed in Tab. 1 4. Those statements include the following aspects:
– Purposes of use, i.e. the list of finalities for which the collected personal
data may be used (for instance statistics or direct marketing) — this is
modeled using StatementPurpose(Statement, Purpose). Multiple purposes
can be defined for a statement.
– The category of personal data that is used, i.e. the collection of personal
identifiable information. Possibly, multiple subject data categories exist for
a statement — this is modeled using predicate StatementSubject(Statement,
DataCategory).
– Global retention limits, i.e. the period of time after which the personal data
will be deleted by the entity (e.g. 30 days) — this limit is expressed us-
ing a partial function (i.e. not every statement expresses a retention limit)
StatementRetentionLimit(Statement) : Duration.
– Obligations built from a Condition and an Action. These are modeled us-
ing partial functions StatementCondtion(Statement) : Condition and State-
mentAction(Statement) : Action). Both are partial functions because not all
statements are linked to actions (e.g. retention limits), and unconditional
obligations are modeled by only modeling the actions of statements.
– Personal data may be forwarded to organizations. In the model, this is ex-
pressed using StatementDestination(Statement, Organization). Possibly, a
statement has multiple destinations.
Obligations are flexible and can be used to express a variety of constraints.
Conditions are events that trigger a reaction, e.g. the personal data is accessed
or the data subject has requested an update. Actions are the resulting events,
for instance the update of his personal data or its forwarding.
Statements guaranteeing the sending of a notification (to a user) when a
specific event occurs (e.g. when a specific category of personal data is accessed
by the entity) are expressed using StatementNotificationGuarantee(Statement).
Accountability occurs at different levels. Some entities may merely declare
their intended practices, without providing any companion evidence. Other en-
tities provide data handling logs. In the model this is denoted using function
StatementProof(Statement) : StatementEvidence. It may not always be possible
to check the compliance of data handling logs with obligations. Logs can be in a
4 For the complete model of the statements, see https://code.google.com/p/
inferring-accountability/.
format which is not standardized, or semantics may not be provided by the entity.
We therefore distinguish between three levels of assurance (StatementEvidence)
for data handling statements:
1. A statement is (purely) Declarative if data handling logs relevant to the
statement are not made available by the entity publishing the statement.
2. If data handling logs are provided together with the statement but cannot
be checked straight away, the statement obtains the status LoggedUnverified.
3. If a statement is provided together with logs that have been checked for
compliance (e.g. through a trusted log analysis software), the statement is
said to be LoggedVerified. This is the highest level of accountability for a
data handling statement, since actual behavior has both been recorded and
shown to be compliant with the statement.
4.4 Trust Perception and Global Accountability Inference
While organizations may feature complex hierarchies with heterogeneous data
handling practices, individuals care about what happens to their personal data
globally. A panoramic overview of the worst-case scenario in terms of data pro-
cessing (i.e. what are the weakest global guarantees?) is relevant to individuals,
since they must often decide whether to interact with an entire organization.
Most of the time, they cannot cherry-pick with which subcontractors to share
their data with.
Global accountability inference is a central feature of this framework that
builds such a synthetic statement for data subjects. It deduces global guarantees
from the local accountability statements of all entities involved in the system.
These (subjective) guarantees depend on trust perceptions of data subjects.
Individuals display different levels of trust in the entities that handle their
personal data. The framework’s user model reflects this socio-technical aspect by
modeling three levels of trust, corresponding to three typical types of individuals:
– Naive individuals always trust data handling statements, even if statements
are purely declarative (i.e. no evidence in the form of a log is provided);
– Regular individuals only trust statements co-occurring with relevant data
handling logs;
– Privacy-aware individuals are most skeptical and trust only statements for
which verified logs have been provided by issuing entities.
Furthermore, the user model includes UserTrust(Organization), the user’s
high-level trust perception towards organizations. It represents his trust in de-
clared data handling practices of related organizations. This also implies that
all operators they employ and components they own are trusted by him. The
modeled video surveillance scenario features the aforementioned three user mod-
els: naive (U1 ), regular (U2 ) and privacy-aware (U3 ). It also assumes that no
organization is trusted, i.e. UserTrust(Organization) is the empty set.
type Statement = { StatR1 ; StatR2 ;StatR3 ;StatR4 ; . . . }
type Purpose = { Evidence;DetectIncident ;Commerce; Identification }
type Condition = { RequestLegalAuthority ;NoLegalInvestigation }
type Action = { Collecting;Monitoring;Storing;Forwarding;Accessing }
type Duration isa int = { 30; 60; 90 }
type Permission constructed from { Always;Never }
type StatementEvidence constructed from { Declarative;
LoggedUnverified ;LoggedVerified }
StatementFrom(Statement) : Entity = { StatR1 → RailwayCompany;
StatR2 → RailwayCompany;StatR3 → RailwayCompany;
StatR4 → RailwayCompany; . . . }
StatementSubject(Statement,DataCategory) = { StatR1 ,Face;
StatR1 ,BlurredFace;StatR1 ,Gait;StatR1 ,Height;StatR1 ,Behavior ;
StatR2 ,PictureIncident ;StatR3 ,PictureIncident;StatR4 ,PersData;
. . . }
StatementPurpose(Statement,Purpose) = { StatR1 ,DetectIncident ;StatR2 ,
Evidence;StatR3 ,Commerce; . . . }
partial StatementCondtion(Statement) : Condition = {
StatR2 → RequestLegalAuthority ; . . . }
StatementPermission(Statement) : Permission = { StatR1 → Always;
StatR2 → Always; StatR3 → Never ;StatR4 → Always; . . . }
partial StatementAction(Statement) : Action = { StatR1 → Collecting;
StatR2 → Forwarding;StatR3 → Collecting; . . . }
StatementDestination(Statement,Organization) = {
StatR2 ,LegalAuthority ; . . . }
partial StatementRetentionLimit(Statement) : Duration = {
StatR4 → 60; . . . }
StatementNotificationGuarantee(Statement) = { }
StatementProof (Statement) : StatementEvidence = {
StatR1 → LoggedUnverified ;StatR2 → Declarative;
StatR3 → LoggedUnverified ;StatR4 → LoggedUnverified ; . . . }
IDP Listing 3: Partial system model representing the statements of the entities
involved in the video surveillance scenario.
This impact of these user trust models on the perception of global account-
ability guarantees is shown in Tab. 2. For instance, a naive user considers he is
guaranteed that merely declared statements of an entity E, owned or employed
by organization O, correspond with actual data handling practices. By contrast,
a regular user only considers merely declared statements to be guaranteed if he
trusts O (i.e. UserTrust(O)), and assumes statements provided together with
logs to be guaranteed, whether these logs are checked for compliance or not.
Table 2. Global statement evidence deduction rules — the global evidence for the state-
ment S by the entity E owned by the organization O is (U)ncertain or (G)uaranteed
for the modeled user.
StatementProof(S)= Declared Logged-unverified Logged-and-verified
Naive user G G G
Regular user F (E) : {G,U}⋆ G G
Privacy-aware user F(E) : {G,U}⋆ F(E) : {G,U}⋆ G
⋆F (E) =′ G′ ⇔ UserTrust(O) ∧ (ComponentOf (E) = O ∨ EmployeeOf (E) = O)
⋆F (E) =′ U ′ ⇔ ¬UserTrust(O) ∧ (ComponentOf (E) = O ∨ EmployeeOf (E) = O)
Global statement computations are performed differently for duties (i.e. state-
ments featuring Always) and for prohibitions (i.e. statements featuring Never).
Beside these categories, models also include statements expressing notification
guarantees and global retention limits. Comparable with duties, these also fea-
ture Always. Nevertheless, these are treated differently in computations.
Global statements are expressed in terms of global data categories (i.e. users
are concerned what happens to their personal data). Let S be an individual
statement of entity E, CanCollect(E,DC) a data category DC that can be col-
lected by an entity E, and Sub(S,DC) representing that data category DC is a
subject of S. Tab. 3 summarizes the worst-case deduction rules that depend on
the global statement evidence for the computation of GlobalDataCategory(S,DC),
the global data categories derived from S.
Duties. Global statements using Always are built as follows:
– The global purposes of use for a global data category are constructed from
the union of all purposes of (individual) duties S, with GlobalDataCate-
gory(S,DC). These represent worst-case global purposes which are conjunc-
tive. For instance, personal data is collected for commercial and statistical
reasons. If no purpose is explicitly specified, then all purposes are assumed
to be permitted globally.
– The global conditions of use for a data category are constructed from the
disjunction of all conditions of duties S, with GlobalDataCategory(S,DC). If
Table 3. Worst-case computation rules for deducing GlobalDataCategory(S,DC), the
global data categories DC deduced from the individual statement S of entity E, with
Sub(S,DC) the subject DC of statement S, and CanCollect(E,DC ) the data categories
collectable by E.
Global statement evidence of S: Uncertain Guaranteed
Duty(S) CanCollect(E,DC ) ψ(S,E,DC )⋆
Prohibition(S) ψ(S,E,DC )⋆ Sub(S,DC )
NotificationGuarantee(S) Sub(S,DC) ψ(S,E,DC )⋆
RetentionLimit(S) Sub(S,DC) ψ(S,E,DC )⋆
⋆ψ(S,E,DC ) ≡ CanCollect(E,DC ) ∧ Sub(S,DC)
at least one unconditional statement exists, no overall conditional statement
is generated.
– The global actions for a data category are built from the union of all actions
of individual duties S, with GlobalDataCategory(S,DC).
– The global level of assurance (i.e. global evidence) for a data category is
Uncertain if at least one uncertain statement (in the sense of Tab. 3) exists
for this data category. Else, the global statement is considered Guaranteed.
– The global notification guarantee for events relative to a data category is built
from the conjunction of all individual notification guarantees S relative to
that data category, with GlobalDataCategory(S,DC).
– The global retention limit for a data category is the maximum of all retention
limts S existing for the data category, with GlobalDataCategory(S,DC).
Prohibitions. Global statements using Never are built as follows:
– The global purposes of use for a global data category are constructed from
the union of all purposes of individual prohibitions S, with GlobalDataCat-
egory(S,DC). These represent worst-case global purposes which are disjunc-
tive. For instance, personal data is never collected for commercial or statis-
tical reasons. Individual prohibitions without explicit purpose are omitted
during the deduction of global purposes (i.e. worst-case).
– The global conditions of use for a data category are constructed from the con-
junction of all conditions of prohibitions S, with GlobalDataCategory(S,DC).
Unconditional statements are omitted.
– The global actions for a data category is computed as for duties, mutatis
mutandis.
– The global level of assurance for a data category is computed as for duties,
mutatis mutandis.
In global statements, trust is expressed in a binary way (i.e. GAPEvidence):
statements are, from the point of view of the data subject, either Uncertain
or Guaranteed. Both global notification guarantees and global retention limits,
part of the GAP, are expressed as duties. Global statements present guarantees
as a function of categories of personal data. Once global statements have been
computed, they are represented as in Listing 4. They are categorized as follows:
– Global duties about collecting personal data — declaring actions about the
use, collection, or storage of personal data.
– Global duties about distributing personal data — declaring actions that for-
ward data to external organizations.
– Global prohibitions for collecting personal data — expressing that the use,
collection, or storage of personal data is forbidden.
– Global prohibitions for distributing personal data — forbidding the forward-
ing of personal data to an organization.
– Global notification guarantees — declaring the sending of a notification upon
the occurrence of a specific event.
– Global retention limits — expressing the time limit after which all categories
of personal data must be deleted.
5 Computation and Evaluation
We illustrate a possible use of the framework with an IDP realization 1. Our
realization infers the GAPs of the user models U1 , U2 , and U3 described earlier,
representing individuals under video surveillance in a railway station. The model
was generated in less than a second on a personal computer. We first compare
the resulting profiles for naive, regular, and privacy-aware data subjects. Next,
we discuss how the statements of entities and users are modeled.
5.1 Trust-Dependent GAP Inference
First, given the type of user and his trust perception toward organizations, we
deduce for each entity the user’s global statement evidence using the rules of
Tab. 2. For instance, U2 (i.e. regular user) is sufficiently guaranteed that data
practices comply with declared ones if they are merely logged. Instead, U3 is
satisfied when statements are logged and verified by an auditor or just logged in
case organizations are trusted by him. This global evidence is then used for the
deduction of the GAP using the rules of Tab. 3. The inferred GAPs are summa-
rized in Tab. 4. None of these contain global prohibitions. However, individual
statements of entities include two prohibitions (i.e. R.3 and I.3 ). The reason for
this is that worst-case computation rules give priority to global duties containing
data categories that are subject of both duties and prohibitions. Semantically,
this corresponds to a user who is more concerned about the categories of data
used rather than about the unused ones.
1 A detailed IDP realization — together with the output containing the GAPs
for the three user models — can be found at https://code.google.com/p/
inferring-accountability/.
type GAPEvidence constructed from { Uncertain;Guaranteed }
GAPCollectData(DataCategory)
GAPCollectDataAction(DataCategory,Action)
GAPCollectDataForPurposeOf (DataCategory,Purpose)
GAPCollectDataCondition(DataCategory,Condition)
GAPCollectDataProof (DataCategory,GAPEvidence)
GAPForwardDataTo(DataCategory,Organization)
GAPForwardDataAction(DataCategory,Action)
GAPForwardDataForPurposeOf (DataCategory,Purpose)
GAPForwardDataCondition(DataCategory,Condition)
GAPForwardDataProof (DataCategory,GAPEvidence)
GAPNeverCollectData(DataCategory)
GAPNeverCollectDataForPurposeOf(DataCategory,Purpose)
GAPNeverCollectDataCondition(DataCategory,Condition)
GAPNeverCollectDataProof (DataCategory,GAPEvidence)
GAPNeverForwardDataTo(DataCategory,Organization)
GAPNeverForwardDataForPurposeOf (DataCategory,Purpose)
GAPNeverForwardDataCondition(DataCategory,Condition)
GAPNeverForwardDataProof (DataCategory,GAPEvidence)
GAPNotificationGuarantee(DataCategory)
GAPNotificationGuaranteeCondition(DataCategory,Condition)
GAPNotificationGuaranteeProof (DataCategory,GAPEvidence)
GAPRetentionLimit(DataCategory,Duration)
GAPRetentionLimitCondition(DataCategory,Condition)
GAPRetentionLimitProof (DataCategory,GAPEvidence)
IDP Listing 4: Modeling concepts representing the GAP.
Global duties for collecting data are perceived differently by U1 , U2 , and
U3 . Since U1 is satisfied with statements that are purely declarative, he be-
lieves that data collection duties are respected by the organizations. Having
the same guarantees U2 is only partially convinced, since he requires at least
data handling logs while the security company’s duty S.1 is purely declarative.
Therefore, Time and Location, subjects of S.1, are considered as global duty
data categories that are uncertain. U3 needs the strongest guarantees. He is not
convinced for any of the data categories part of the GAP. He expects for all data
collection duties that logs exist and that they are verified by an auditor. For
instance, because duty R.1 is logged-unverified, the duty subjects, such as Face
and BlurredFace, are not sufficiently guaranteed for U3 . Furthermore, due to R.1
an additional data category PictureIncident is deduced in U3 ’s GAP. This fol-
lows from the computation rule in Tab. 3 for duties with global evidence that is
uncertain for U3 , and the given railway station’s camera capability Component-
CanCollect(Camera,PictureIncident). Also, comparing the GAP of U3 with the
others, more purposes for collecting data are deduced. In particular, besides that
BlurredFace and Gait are collected for incident detection (i.e. DetectIncident),
these are used as Evidence of incidents as well.
Global data forward duties are computed from the declarative duty R.2 and
the merely logged duty S.2. Both duties declare to forward data to other stake-
holders in the system. The results show that U1 is satisfied with the guaran-
tees provided that the system respects data forwarding declarations. The same
guarantees are too weak to convince U2 and U3 . Both doubt that actual data
practices correspond with declared ones. At first glance, one could expect that
U2 assumes that Time and Location, part of the GAP, are used as declared
by S.2. However, S.2 is redundant with the purely declared duty R.2 because
Time and Location are subjects of R.2 as well. This can be deduced using the
computation rules of Tab. 3 and from the railway company’s image database ca-
pabilities, namely ComponentCanCollect(ImageDB,Time) and ComponentCan-
Collect(ImageDB,Location).
Global retention limits are computed from R.4, I.4, and D.3. Results show
that retention limits are conditional (i.e. NoLegalInvestigation) for all data cat-
egories in the GAP of U1 and U2 . The GAP of U3 shows an additional un-
conditional retention limit for data category PersData (i.e. personal data). This
is deduced from R.4, which provided evidence not fulfilling U3 ’s expectations.
Indeed, R.4 is just logged, and not verified. Furthermore, U2 only has partial
guarantees for Time and Location since evidence of R.3 sufficiently guarantees
him. In case of U3 , R.3 provides insufficient evidence. Hence, usage of Time and
Location are not sufficiently guaranteed according to U3 ’s GAP.
5.2 Statements Modeling and User Models
The statements presented in the scenario are atomic declarations, i.e. they con-
sist of single actions on subject data categories. Concepts in the framework were
defined for modeling atomic statements. However, statements may contain mul-
tiple declarations. The concepts defined lack expressiveness for modeling these.
These statements must be represented by the atomic parts from which they
are composed. For instance, the image database is associated with a declarative
statement announcing the storage of personal data of categories blurred face and
gait for a maximum of 30 days and for the purpose of statistics and marketing.
This is modeled as (a) a duty declaring that data categories blurred face and
gait are stored, and (b) a retention limit specifying that data is kept for a maxi-
mum of 30 days. In the model, these items correspond to separate elements of the
Statement domain. Though both statements have the same purposes, these must
be expressed separately. In particular, StatementPurpose(Statement,Purpose) re-
lates the purposes statistics and marketing to the duty and retention limit with
2 statements × 2 purposes relations. Decomposing combined statements may
imply that statement relations grow combinatorially. Similarly, each Statement
Table 4. Inferred GAP synthesizing global accountability in the camera surveillance
system for user models U1 (1), U2 (2), and U3 (3). The numbers in the table indicate
the user models for which the statements in the left column, represented relatively to
the different data categories, are valid.
PictureIncident Face BlurredFace Gait Height Behavior Time Location PersData
Global Collection duties
Actions
Collecting 3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3
Accessing 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3
Storing 3 1,2,3 3 3 3 3 1,2,3 1,2,3
Monitoring 3 3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 3 3
Purposes
All 1,2,3
DetectIncident 3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 3 3
Evidence 3 3 3 3 3 1,2,3 1,2,3
Conditions
Unconditional 3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3
Guaranteed 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1 1
Global Forward duties
Actions
Forwarding
to LegalAuthority 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3
Purposes
Evidence 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3
Conditions
RequestLegalAuthority 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3
Guaranteed 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Global Retention Limits
Duration (days)
60 days 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 3
90 days 1,2 1,2
Conditions
UnConditional 3
NoLegalInvestigation 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3
Guaranteed 1 1 1 1 1 1 1,2 1,2
element must be related to the Entity “ImageDatabase”, the Permission “Al-
ways”, and to the StatementEvidence “Declarative”. Furthermore, each duty is
related to the Action “Store”.
Users model. The coarse-grained user categorization we use facilitates user mod-
eling since modelers only need to specify user types via a single constant, for
instance TypeOfUser = NaiveUser . The model’s user types intuitively represent
typical real-world users, determining how data subjects appreciate statements
and evidence from organizations. They reflect the fact that skeptical users are
more difficult to convince of the compliance of actual data handling with de-
clared practices. The user model also addresses the high-level trust perception
of users. Namely, UserTrust(O) expresses that a user trusts the organization O.
Reusing framework components. The framework consists of modular compo-
nents, making possible isolated changes to one part while leaving the others
intact. A given system model (e.g. the railway station camera surveillance sce-
nario) is unaffected when new types of users are introduced. Similarly, if an
auditor collects different samples of statement evidence, only changes to the
evidence in the statement model are required.
Detecting conflicts. The user model could be extended with user privacy prefer-
ences containing prohibitions. This aspect could be used by auditors wanting to
verify e.g. whether a system, run by a commercial organization, is not collecting
sensitive health information. The individual statements of system entities are
another flexible facet. Typically, these statements form a large set of opaque
and potentially inconsistent declarations. Automated verification can be added
to the system-independent part of the framework for easy conflict detection.
6 Related Work
A privacy evaluation framework based on trust assumptions is introduced in
[9]. Like our model, it involves multiple stakeholders. This framework was later
implemented in IDP [10]. A distinction is made between storage-trusted and
distribution-trusted organizations. The privacy analysis focuses on which data
is needed for access to services, and how personal data is distributed between
interacting services. By contrast, this paper’s model targets interactions between
organizations, not services, and investigates how statements about personal data
handling, backed with varying levels of evidence, combine with trust perceptions
to yield assumptions about the processing of personal data.
The approach of using standardized privacy policies to enable accountability
by clarifying obligations is widespread. In particular, the idea of combining pri-
vacy policies with data handling logs to automatically check compliance ex post
appears in [28]. The question of the gap between system event logs and logs at the
level of abstraction of privacy policies is addressed in [5]. The consequences of log
design choices for log analysis and accountability are addressed in [4]. Adequate
log design for compliance checking is tricky because of the numerous possible
semantic ambiguities. Both papers presume a single data controller rather than
the setting of this paper — a constellation of interacting data processors with
different, potentially incompatible privacy policies.
Beyond computer science, the scope of application of accountability is a
vividly debated issue in the privacy regulation debate [14]. A key question related
to our work is how far data controllers should be required to go to demonstrate
compliance. Distinctions are sometimes [6] made between different levels of ac-
countability, ranging from public declarations of intent to full technical trans-
parency, such as the one that we advocate here. The adequacy of procedures,
i.e. organizational measures, is often discussed. Privacy Impact Assessments are
often advocated [30] and can be seen as a bridge between accountability of
procedures and accountability of practice if the assessment is conducted in suf-
ficient detail. The question of privacy-preserving surveillance infrastructures is
addressed in particular in the PARIS project [1], with an interdisciplinary angle.
7 Conclusions
We described an accountability inference model and its realization in the IDP
knowledge base system. Trust perceptions are taken into account to compute
global accountability statements from the individual statements made by inter-
acting entities. We distinguish between different levels of proof for the individual
statements, again influencing the resulting global accountability statements. Our
approach is illustrated with a scenario involving stakeholders in a railway surveil-
lance infrastructure. The framework is not tied to any particular scenario and
can be extended easily. Our representation of data handling evidence is only
implicit, and therefore coarse-grained. A more refined approach would model
the semantics of log compliance explicitly. This level of detail seems difficult to
implement within a first-order logic-based framework. In the current version of
the framework, the auditor acting on behalf of an individual is not notified of
privacy policy conflicts automatically. Including this aspect would remove the
need for manual compatibility checking.
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